Introduction
The conflict in Afghanistan has matured into a relatively stable social system that menaces the lives of millions of people. This conflict forms the core of a regional conflict formation, including the continuing challenges in Tajikistan, the growing conflict led by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan involving several states, processes of political decay in Pakistan, challenges to political order in Iran, and the insurgency in Kashmir. It is linked to long-distance organized crime through both the drug trade and smuggling originating in Dubai. The expanding drug trade has led to the rapid transmission of HIV/ AIDS in the region through intravenous drug use.
Given the long-standing and regional character of the conflict, it would be a mistake to analyze it solely or even primarily in terms of the political differences between the current protagonists, the Taliban, led by Mullah Muhammad Umar, and the forces of the United Front, led by Ahmad Shah Massoud. It is unlikely to be settled by a negotiated agreement between these forces. The fact that this conflict has continued for over twenty years, despite repeated changes in the identity of the antagonists and the issues apparently at stake, indicates that its causes transcend such transient manifestations. Nor should one analyze the policy objective simply as "peace" or "ending the war." A more desirable policy goal would be reconstructing the country as part of the interstate and economic structure of an entire region. The usual notion of a peace process in a civil war within a national framework includes an end to outside interference; a negotiated cease-fire perhaps monitored by peacekeepers; an interim government; a process for establishing long-term governance; and, finally, reconstruction.
Such a process will not work in a case such as Afghanistan. The war is not a civil war but a transnational one. The transnational links are too deep to be untangled and will have to be transformed.
Economic and social issues such as education cannot await a political settlement. The absence or weakness of institutions is one of the causes of the conflict and makes any purely political settlement difficult if not impossible. Hence efforts at reconstruction and institution building need to precede and act as a catalyst for political agreements, rather than the reverse. Conditional planning for reconstruction can function as an incentive for both Afghan and regional actors and is likely to be more effective than sanctions alone. All of these issues need to be tackled within a regional framework, integrating areas usually separated as parts of Central and South Asia, as well as the Middle East (or West Asia).
The recent UN mission to West Africa, as well as the Security Council mission relating to the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, represent the scope of action needed and the necessity of integrating the political, economic, humanitarian, and human rights components of international action.
If the situation remains unchanged, this entire region (Afghanistan, southern Central Asia, Pakistan, Kashmir, maybe parts of Iran) could become a battleground for decades, like the Great Lakes region of Central Africa. Millions of people could be uprooted, impoverished, and killed by war, famine, and epidemics. Central Asia will have even greater global consequences than Central Africa, since it will be the home to expanding global terrorist groups. The effect on Pakistan could lead sympathizers of these terrorist groups to gain access to nuclear weapons.
Conflict Analysis

Background
.1 State Formation and Imperial Collapse
The conflict in Afghanistan is the core of a struggle over the reconstitution of political and economic relations in southwest Asia in the aftermath of the collapse first of the British and then of the Russian empire. The partition of the British Empire in South Asia left behind Pakistan as an existentially insecure state, whose insecurity increased after the loss of its eastern portion in 1971. Pakistan sees its main security task as obtaining parity with India, a country almost eight times larger, which has resulted in the ruination of Pakistan's economy due to excessive military spending, the use of "asymmetric strategies" such as support for insurgencies and extremist groups (techniques learned from the US during the Afghan war), and the quest for "strategic depth" -links and alliances with parts of the Muslim world to the west. The quest for "strategic depth" has defined Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan and then Central Asia for decades.
Afghanistan became a weak buffer state between the US and Sovietled alliance systems, successors of the British and Russian empires.
The collapse of the Russian empire in its Soviet form led to the dissolution of the Soviet-supported Afghan army, the core of the state.
Pakistan saw opportunities for further "strategic depth" in a reconstitution of a now-stateless Afghanistan, bordered to the north by weak, ill-defined nominally Muslim, nominally sovereign republics.
Afghan political elites and economic actors maneuvered in this context. First the British and then the Soviets supported the formation of centralized military power in an Afghan state dominated by the royal regimes of the Muhammadzai lineage of Durrani Pashtuns. This dominant lineage remained more or less neutral in international affairs, though it came to depend on Soviet aid for the core of its coercive power, since the army was Soviet-trained and supplied from 1955. The Pashtun ethnic group -with as many or more members in NW Pakistan as in Afghanistan, in a sense considered Afghanistan "its" state, as "Afghan" means both "Pashtun" and "citizen of Af- After the overthrow of the Muhammadzais in 1978, the Soviets supported a narrow Communist group. The US, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia responded by arming several previously marginal Islamist extremist groups, which predominated among the mujahidin organizations that fought the Soviets and Afghan Communists. The combination of these approaches led to the final collapse of the Afghan state in 1992.
Both the Soviet-supported communists and the US-supported
Islamists attacked and destroyed the educated elites that had ruled the country and provided it with some coherence, setting the stage for the advent of the Taliban.
Struggles in a Stateless Country
After the collapse of the army in April 1992, mujahidin and some former government militias coalesced into several ethno-regional po- 
Formation of a Regional Conflict Complex
The conflict in Afghanistan is now at the core of a region including conflicts in that country, Tajikistan 
Role of the Taliban
The Taliban movement initially responded to some needs felt by Afghan people and received some popular support in Pashtundominated areas during its initial advances in 1994-95. 
.5 Conflict-Promoting Structural Factors
Pursuit of armed conflict in Afghanistan is greatly facilitated by two 
Afghan Actors
At present there are two principal fighting forces in Afghanistan: the 
The Taliban
The The formal IEA ruling structure is headed by an amir (Mullah Muhammad Umar), who is assisted by shuras, or consultative bodies. He apparently has the final say on all matters. Subordinate to him is the Kabul shura, effectively a cabinet of ministers, as well as a shura of ulama and a military shura. The IEA has appointed provincial governors and administrators of districts, cities, towns, and precincts from the center, following the administrative divisions of former Afghan governments. As in most such governments, the administrators are invariably natives of areas other than the ones they govern, and have been regularly shuffled between areas. Mullah Umar and all but one member of the Supreme Shura are Qandahari Pashtuns. 1 All the members of the military shura whose ethnic and regional origins are known to the authors are Qandahari Pashtuns. The Kabul shura is also predominantly Qandahari but includes more Eastern Pashtuns, a couple of Persian speakers, and at least one
Most of the
Uzbek. All without a single exception are Sunni mullahs trained in private madrasas.
The Taliban's political structure and methods of governance have de- Pakistan, rather than strengthening internal governance and bringing more practical moderate elements to the forefront, has allowed this deterioration to take place, because it is easier for Pakistan to influence decision making with a few key players rather than larger shuras.
Pakistan has spent no effort or money on training an appropriate Taliban bureaucracy, (in contrast to what it attempted to do, with US support, for the mujahidin based in Peshawar during the Soviet war).
This deterioration in internal governance and centralization with an even more obscure process of decision-making makes it virtually impossible for the international community, UN agencies, and the UN mediator to interact with the present Taliban leadership. This presents a major impediment to any peace process, humanitarian aid, or attempts to moderate the Taliban.
The Taliban are effectively a transnational organization, reflecting the multifaceted links that have grown up over the last twenty years be- 
Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Harakat-i lslami-yi Afghanistan)
Harakat is a Shi'a party that never joined Wahdat, originally led by Ayatollah Muhammad Asif Muhsini, and long allied with Jamiat. Its relations with Iran are strained, and it split within the past year. Its leadership is mostly non-Hazara Shi'a. One faction of this party constitutes the mainstay of the successful resistance to the Taliban in Dara-yi Suf district.
Islamic Union of Afghanistan (lttihad-i lslami-yi Afghanistan) -Sayyaf
Abd al-Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf, also a Kharruti Pashtun (from Paghman, near Kabul) was the leader most favored by Saudi Arabia in the jihad, and was known by Afghans as "Wahhabi." He has stayed allied with Burhanuddin Rabbani, with whom he worked at Kabul University in the 1970s, and has a small base in Kapisa province.
Council of the East (Shura-yi Mashriqi)
This 
Aims of United Front Members
These groups had somewhat different aims. Wahdat and Junbish articulated the need for regional autonomy and power sharing among various groups in Afghanistan. Hazara groups in particular insisted on control over their own areas and recognition of Shi'a law (fiqh-i Ja'afari) in their own affairs. Jamiat's articulated plans for the future Afghan state seemed as centralized as the Taliban's, though the ISA was less successful in implementing such plans. Massoud is said to have developed a plan for a quasi-federal system based on nine regions.
Islamic Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-i lslami-yi Afghanistan) -Hikmatyar
This radical Islamist party, led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a Kharruti Pashtun from Northern Afghanistan, favored by Pakistan until 1994, now controls few military or political resources other than the infamy of its leader. Hikmatyar apparently still has much of the US and Saudi money he was given for jihad, however, which he could use to disrupt developments he opposes.
International Actors
The combined effects of the war and the dissolution of the Soviet 
States
Pakistan
The state with the closest ties and strongest links to Afghanistan is Pakistan. It is a proactive rather than reactive player. Pakistan's military rulers saw the war in Afghanistan as an opportunity to reverse Pakistan's antagonistic relations with Afghanistan over Pashtunistan, providing it with "strategic depth" in its confrontation with India. 
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia appears to have continued to fund much of Pakistan's policy in Afghanistan through both official and unofficial channels until mid-1998, when relations broke down over Usama Bin Ladin.
Private Arab groups in the Persian Gulf may continue to supply support.
Iran
Iran's links to Afghan groups have changed and deepened over time.
Iran's policy is dictated by a combination of solidarity with the Shi'a in Afghanistan (and in Pakistan) and strategic concerns over the US embargo, access to Central Asia, and rivalry with Saudi Arabia. 
United States
Current US policy toward Afghanistan has been almost completely dominated by concern over the Taliban's harboring of Usama Bin Ladin, whom DCI George Tenet characterized as the single greatest threat to US national security. The US together with Russia pushed the sanctions resolutions through the Security Council despite doubts articulated by many members -none of whom, however, wished to risk political capital with the US over the Taliban. The US has also officially classified the IMU as a "terrorist organization." It has not yet so classified the Taliban. "Terrorism" is increasingly emerging as the major threat to US interests as conceived in Washington, and the current administration is likely to strengthen that trend. Nonetheless, the administration has engaged with Afghanistan's humanitarian crisis, pledging $43 million in new humanitarian aid, and is evaluating the Taliban's efforts at eradicating poppy cultivation to see what response is required. The predominant mood seems to be toward rethinking existing sanctions and complementing them with incentives, without backing off from a hard line on Bin Ladin. The administration is also likely to attempt more engagement with Pakistan.
International Organizations
The United Nations operates in Afghanistan largely without other in- 
Peace Process
UN Peace Efforts
The only official actor that mainly defines its mission as making peace in Afghanistan is UNSMA. The UN humanitarian mission has also sought to undertake peace building through community-based programs. The core of UNSMA's mission, as defined by the General Assembly and the "six plus two", has been to offer good offices and mediation to help the Afghan parties to the conflict seek a negotiated settlement, leading to a broad-based government, cease-fire, and, ultimately, reconstruction. UNSMA occasionally also defines its mission as offering good offices and mediation to the various foreign powers involved in Afghanistan, in the hope that, if they settled their differences, it would facilitate agreement among the Afghans. These powers mostly prefer to handle such issues directly, without UN involvement.
There has not been any ongoing "peace process" in the conventional 
Regional Peace Efforts
From time to time Pakistan and Iran (encouraged by Brahimi) engaged in a dialogue over Afghanistan and even staged a couple of joint missions to the Afghan parties. These have now completely collapsed, as there is such a high level of distrust between these two countries, which regard each other as antagonists and rivals in both Afghanistan and Central Asia. 
Afghan Exile Peace Efforts
Structural Obstacles to Peace Processes
There are several reasons that a peace process is so difficult:
• Lack of stalemate. According to one theory, fighters agree to negotiate when they believe they cannot achieve more through war, i.e. when they reach a "hurting stalemate". In transnational wars like Afghanistan, however, access to external aid and in- the Taliban have encountered resistance to recruitment from local communities even in their core areas, but their ability to recruit from the much larger population of Pakistan compensates for this problem. To disrupt such linkages often requires a very high level of determination from powerful states, which may, however, see the theater of conflict as remote from their short-term interests.
• Spoilers with an interest in conflict. Some powerful interests, which may even have lobbies within some governments, may not want to end the war. Some actors (spoilers) can become rich and powerful by exercising violence in a lawless environment, and they will attempt to subvert any peace process.
Those benefiting from the drug trade, smuggling, and gem trade could fall into this category. Such spoilers are typically few in number, but they have clear interests and resources to pursue them, while the much larger number of people suffering from the conflict lack resources and organizational capacity. For instance, try to imagine Massoud taking up a position in a coalition government with the Taliban. Who is responsible for his security in Kabul? There is no national army or security force that is even slightly independent of its leader. No one will trust his security to anyone else's forces, and it will be very difficult to convince third parties without a direct interest to send forces to Afghanistan, though it may become necessary at some stage.
• Conflicting international interests. International actors agree on "peace" as a goal when they care less about the outcome of a conflict than about the process of violence. That is less and less the case in Afghanistan. Pakistan seeks victory by the Taliban. The war increasingly pits Pakistan against all of Afghanistan's other neighbors, as well as, indirectly, the US and Russia, which increasingly seek to defeat or at least coerce the Taliban.
Options for Policy
No Immediate Solution to the Crisis
The US and Russia seek to force the Taliban to change major policies through sanctions against a country whose economy is already almost entirely illegal. A UN-led negotiating process over formation of a "broad-based government" is meaningless in the current environment. The Taliban are seeking to meet those international conditions they have identified as acceptable by pursuing war to gain full control of Afghan territory and forcing peasants to halt opium production.
The result of all of these policies, together with the drought (besides genuine reduction in opium growing and, as usual, plenty of killing), is to drive people off the land into IDP camps in Afghanistan, islands in the Panj river (since Tajikistan will not admit them), and camps in Pakistan that are more like concentration than refugee camps.
There is no immediate solution to this crisis. In the absence of an accepted state structure, negotiations cannot lead to a coalition or interim government. The usual sequencing that the UN and others have in mind involves: an end to external involvement; a cease-fire; formation of an interim government; an election or constitution making process, simultaneous with the start of reconstruction; and "return" to normalcy (a state remembered by less than half of the population).
But the extensive links between Afghan and Pakistani populations and institutions cannot be broken: at best, they can be transformed.
The composition of a government cannot resolve the problem. The
Taliban are not a political group that took over an existing government; they are a movement that is building a weak but centralized state. The Ashkhabad talks in 1999 failed over the issue of qiyadi In their somewhat disingenuous message about the reasons for destroying the Bamiyan and other statues, the Taliban indirectly exposed the problem: they claim that the council of ulama of the IEA decreed the destruction after a UNESCO delegation offered aid only for cultural preservation and not for starving people. Obviously, destroying the country's (and the world's) cultural heritage did not feed anyone either (quite the contrary), but this incident shows the need to complement existing sanctions with a major donor effort to show that, under the right conditions, substantial levels of funding will be available for reconstruction. The plan prepared by those associated with the Rome process should strengthen this effort. Indeed both the drought and the ban on poppy should provide the occasion for direct engagement with Afghans (Taliban, UF, and many others) on how to rehabilitate the country and its people.
Towards a Broad Reconstruction Process
Such engagement would have to take place at several levels and would require that the idea of reconstruction be made concrete, comprehensible, and credible for political actors. Such an effort could perhaps focus around the World Bank planning process that UN envoy
Francese V endrell has helped to initiate. As he envisages, such a process would both provide UNSMA with much more leverage than it now has and help it transform its agenda in a more realistic direction.
To be effective politically, such a planning process should not consist The conditions for assistance have to be clarified and discussed with all Afghan actors -the Taliban, Massoud, and the other components of the UF, but also with society more broadly -as part of this debate.
The conditions would include elimination of support for terrorism in a way that respects Afghan traditions of asylum and international norms against refoulement, an acceptable minimum of gender equity and human rights, and satisfactory security for all groups and regions.
The process must include Afghan women at all levels. International actors should make clear that they will respond to opium eradication with support for crop substitution and employment creation. 
No Solution Without Pakistan
This can work only if Pakistan too sees an interest in supporting such a process and it is expanded to a regional scope. Afghanistan, Pakistan will also benefit in a major way. Contracts will go to Pakistani firms, trade will resume, and, indeed, Pakistan will link up to Central Asia through an Afghanistan that is not a client state, but that does not threaten Central Asia either. Pakistani experts and economic actors should also be involved in these discussions and processes, and their public should also be informed and engaged through the press, including, very importantly, vernacular press and radio. These would be aimed at transforming, not eliminating, Pakistan's deep involvement in Afghanistan.
As noted, however, not only Pakistan, and not only Pakistan's decision-makers are involved in the conflict processes. The region-wide conflict formation requires a region-wide response. Unfortunately, unlike West Africa, the Great Lakes region, or the Andes, there is no name or bureaucratic niche for the region including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and the post-Soviet Central Asian states, as well as
Western China, and Kashmir, with links to the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, this constitutes the region whose problems need to be addressed in an integrated way as part of the pursuit of reconstruction and peace in Afghanistan.
A starting point could be a joint inter-agency UN mission to all of these countries (and others, such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and India) to evaluate the interlocking elements of conflict, as the recent mission to West Africa did. 'This could be followed by a higherlevel mission, of the Security Council, aimed at forming a political consensus on the interrelations of problems and on the provision of resources to deal with them. Both the political and financial institutions of the international community (international organizations as well as major states) need to develop programs and institutions capable of conceptualizing and acting on this problem in an appropriate regional framework, politically, economically, and in humanitarian action.
Towards a Regional Approach
Among the conclusions of such a consultation would be, in all likelihood: the need to reinforce Tajikistan's precarious peace process, especially through economic assistance; the need for targeted assistance and conflict monitoring in the Ferghana Valley, including Batken;
consultations with the IMU concerning their conditions for laying down their arms; confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan; assistance to and support for Iran's efforts to secure itself against the disruptive effects of drug trafficking; a regional approach to humanitarian assistance to Afghan refuges and displaced people;
economic planning for legitimate commercial crops and products in Afghanistan that could be marketed regionally, such as animal prod-ucts, cut flowers, lavender products (the plant grows wild in several regions), and others; as well as emergency measures to meet the education crisis in Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan.
Such a process would transform the context in which discussions now take place between international and Afghan actors (as well as Pakistan and Central Asia). This process could affect the balance of forces The resultant plans would be the subject of discussions with the UN and other multilateral and bilateral contacts.
States seeking to influence the Taliban and other Afghan and Pakistani actors would certainly refer to this opportunity /process in making various arguments about why Afghan actors should lay down arms and agree to rejoin the international mainstream. Such arguments would strengthen those within the Taliban who want to argue that a more cooperative approach would be rewarded; as of now, those who argue that the whole world is against them are in the ascendant. In addition, if it became clear that the rigid policies of the Taliban were blocking an existing plan for reconstruction, disgruntled actors now on the Taliban side would have a much greater incentive to take risky actions to change the situation, perhaps with the aid of sympathizers within the Taliban. How to provide greater capacity for such actors without becoming involved in covert actions, especially more military assistance, constitutes a key challenge. Such processes could interact in unpredictable ways with Massoud's policies, the Rome process, and other events that may not be known to outsiders.
No one will be able to predict what will happen any more than anyone predicted the appearance and rise of the Taliban. Nevertheless, an effort to create a robust set of incentives for peace building will certainly alter the calculus of many actors.
Strong International Commitment Required
The sanctions should be fine-tuned to convey the message that just as destructive behavior will win no favor, constructive cooperation will be rewarded. Anything that affects the civil economy (in particular the ban on flights and on legitimate official IEA financial transactions) should be removed, especially in the context of serious planning for reconstruction. Future political negotiations should not be primarily focused on the composition of the central government (broad-based or otherwise) but on the need for an impartial (and small) single army and decentralized security arrangements that will enable all groups and regions to participate in a common Afghanistan. Indeed, the structure of state institutions should be part of the debate that the planning process launches. Such a discussion will be much more fruit- 
